A Deep Dive into Adversarial Robustness in Zero-Shot Learning by Yucel, Mehmet Kerim et al.
A Deep Dive into Adversarial Robustness in
Zero-Shot Learning
Mehmet Kerim Yucel1, Ramazan Gokberk Cinbis2, and Pinar Duygulu1
1 Hacettepe University, Department of Computer Engineering
2 Middle East Technical University (METU), Department of Computer Engineering
Abstract. Machine learning (ML) systems have introduced significant
advances in various fields, due to the introduction of highly complex
models. Despite their success, it has been shown multiple times that ma-
chine learning models are prone to imperceptible perturbations that can
severely degrade their accuracy. So far, existing studies have primarily
focused on models where supervision across all classes were available. In
constrast, Zero-shot Learning (ZSL) and Generalized Zero-shot Learning
(GZSL) tasks inherently lack supervision across all classes. In this pa-
per, we present a study aimed on evaluating the adversarial robustness
of ZSL and GZSL models. We leverage the well-established label em-
bedding model and subject it to a set of established adversarial attacks
and defenses across multiple datasets. In addition to creating possibly the
first benchmark on adversarial robustness of ZSL models, we also present
analyses on important points that require attention for better interpre-
tation of ZSL robustness results. We hope these points, along with the
benchmark, will help researchers establish a better understanding what
challenges lie ahead and help guide their work.
1 Introduction
The meteoric rise of complex machine learning models in the last decade sparked
a whole new wave of state-of-the-art (SOTA) results in numerous fields, such as
computer vision, low-level image processing, natural language processing and
speech recognition. Due to the increase in available data, compute power and
architectural improvements, these fields are still seeing rapid improvements in
various tasks with no signs of slowing down.
However, it has been shown [8] that ML models are prone to adversarial ex-
amples, which are perturbations aimed to guide models into inaccurate results.
Such perturbations can successfully misguide models while introducing imper-
ceptible perturbations to a query data. Starting with computer vision, such
attacks have been extended to speech recognition [12], natural language pro-
cessing [16] and various other tasks/modalities [10]. Naturally, equal attention
has been given to defend the models against these attacks, either by designing
robust models or introducing mechanisms to detect and invalidate adversarial
examples [42]. Adversarial machine learning initially focused on small datasets
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in computer vision, such as MNIST and CIFAR-10, but it has been extended to
large datasets such as ImageNet and even commercial products [40,66].
The majority of the adversarial ML literature has so far focused on super-
vised models and aimed to improve their robustness using various approaches. In
Zero-shot learning (ZSL) and Generalized Zero-shot learning (GZSL) settings,
however, the task differs from a generic supervised approach; the aim is to learn
from a set of classes such that we can optimize the knowledge transfer from these
classes to a set of previously unseen classes, which we use during the evaluation
phase. As a result, the notorious problem of ZSL is far from being solved de-
spite the significant advances made in the last few years. The introduction of
adversarial examples to ZSL models would theoretically further exacerbate the
problem.
In this paper, we present an exploratory adversarial robustness analysis on
ZSL techniques 1. Unlike the most recent approaches where ZSL problem is
effectively reduced to a supervised problem [9, 47], we take a a step back and
focus on label embedding model [1,56] and analyze its robustness against several
prominent adversarial attacks and defenses. Through rigorous evaluation on most
widely used ZSL datasets, we establish a framework where we analyse not only
the algorithm itself, but also the effect of each dataset, effect of per-class sample
count, the trends in boundary transitions as well as how the existing knowledge
transfer between seen and unseen classes are effected by adversarial intrusions.
We hope the presented framework will focus the community’s attention on the
robustness of ZSL models, which has largely been neglected. Moreover, this study
will serve as a benchmark for future studies and shed light on important trends
to look out for when analysing ZSL models for adversarial robustness.
2 Related Work
Adversarial attacks. Adversarial ML has been an integral part of ML research
in the last few years as it exposed significant robustness-related problems with
existing models. It has first been shown in [8] that a perturbation can be crafted
by optimizing for misclassification of an image; under certain `-norm constraints
this perturbation can even be imperceptible to humans. A fast, one-step attack
that exploits the gradients of the cost function w.r.t the model parameters to
craft a perturbation was shown in [20]. An iterative algorithm that approximates
the minimum perturbation required for misclassification in ML models has been
shown in [38]. Carlini and Wagner [11] showed that a much improved version
of [8] can be tailored into three different attacks, each using a different `-norm,
that can succesfully scale to ImageNet and invalidate the distillation defense [42].
Transformation attacks [59], universal attacks for a dataset [37], one-pixel
attacks [52], attacks focusing on finding the pixels that will alter the output
the most [41], unrestricted attacks [6], black-box attacks where attacker has
no information about the model [40] and attacks transferred to the physical
1 Code is available at https://github.com/MKYucel/adversarial_robustness_zsl
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world [29] are some highlights of adversarial ML. Moreover, these attacks have
been extended to various other ML models with various modalities, such as
recurrent models [24], reinforcement learning [5], object detection [60], tracking
[15,25], natural language processing [16], semantic segmentation [4], graph neural
networks [71], networks trained on LIDAR data [10] , speech recognition [12],
visual question answering [50] and even commercial systems [33].
Adversarial defenses. In order to address the robustness concerns raised
by adversarial attacks, various defense mechanisms have been proposed, result-
ing into an arms-race in the literature between attacks and defenses. Several
prominent defense techniques include network distillation [42], adversarial train-
ing [8], label smoothing [22], input-gradient regularization [45], analysis of ReLu
activation patterns [34], feature regeneration [7], generalizable defenses [39], ex-
ploitation of GANs [46] and auto-encoders [36] for alleviation of adversarial
changes and feature space regularization via metric learning [35]. These defense
methods rely on either re-training of the network or preparing an additional
module that would either detect or alleviate the adversarial perturbations. An-
other segment of adversarial defenses have borrowed several existing techniques
and used them towards adversarial robustness; JPEG compression [49], bit-depth
reduction, spatial smoothing [62] and total variance minimization [21] are some
examples of such techniques. Adversarial ML field is quite vast; readers are re-
ferred to [3, 61] for a more in-depth discussion.
Zero-shot learning. In majority of the ML fields, SOTA results are gen-
erally held by supervised models, where all classes have a form of strong su-
pervisory signal (i.e. ground-truth labels) that guides the learning. However,
the collection of a supervised training set quickly turns into a bottleneck in se-
mantically scaling up a recognition model. The problem of strong supervision
through ground-truth labels can be somewhat alleviated by the (transductive)
self-supervised learning [27], but the unlabeled data or the auxiliary supervision
may not be available for every task. Zero-shot learning aims to address this is-
sue by bridging the gap between seen (i.e. classes available during training) and
unseen (i.e. classes unavailable during training) classes by transfering the knowl-
edge learned during training. Generalized Zero-Shot learning, on the other hand,
aims to facilitate this knowledge transfer while keeping the accuracy levels on
the seen classes as high as possible. The auxiliary information present for both
seen and unseen classes (i.e. class embeddings) is exploited to bridge the gap.
In its early years, ZSL methods consisted of a two-stage mechanism, where
the attributes of an image were predicted and these attributes were used to find
the class with the most similar attributes [30, 31]. By directly learning a lin-
ear [1, 2, 18, 32] or a non-linear compability [14, 51, 58, 65] function to map from
visual space to a semantic space, later models transitioned to a single-stage
format. The reverse mapping, from semantic space to the visual space [55, 68],
has also been explored for ZSL problem. Embedding both visual and semantic
embeddings into a common latent space for ZSL have also proven to be success-
full [13, 70]. Transductive approaches leveraging visual or semantic information
on unlabeled unseen classes [63, 64] are considered another discriminative ap-
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proach for ZSL. In recent years, in addition to discriminative approaches [26,67],
generative approaches [9, 17, 28, 47] which model the mapping between visual
and semantic spaces are increasingly being used to generate samples for unseen
classes, slowly reducing ZSL to a fully-supervised problem. For further informa-
tion on ZSL, readers are referred to [54,57].
Only a recent unpublished study [69] proposed a ZSL model that is robust
to several adversarial attacks by formulating an adversarial training regime. Our
study, on the other hand, concentrates on setting up a framework and creates a
benchmark to guide researchers’ efforts towards adversarially robust ZSL/GZSL
models, by presenting a detailed analysis of existing datasets and the effects of
several well-established attacks and defenses. To the best of our knowledge, our
study is the first to establish such a benchmark with a detailed analysis.
3 Methodology
3.1 Model Selection
For the model selection, we take a step back and focus on the models that aim
to transfer the knowledge learned from seen classes to unseen classes, unlike
the recent studies that rely on generative models to generate samples using
class embeddings for unseen classes and try to reduce ZSL to a fully supervised
setting. We hypothesize that concentrating on the latter would mean evaluating
the sample generation part for adversarial robustness, rather than evaluating
the robustness of the model that aims directly to facilitate seen/unseen class
knowledge transfer.
As presented in Section 2, there are numerous suitable candidates for our goal.
Towards this end, we select the label-embedding model [1], which has been shown
to be a stable and competitive model in modern benchmarks [57]. Attribute-label
embedding (ALE) model is formulated as
F (x, y;W ) = θ(x)WTφ(y) (1)
where θ(x) is the visual and φ(y) is the class embeddings. These two modalities
are associated through the compatibility function F (), which is parametrized by
learnable weights W.
The reason for selecting ALE can be described by the fact that it is one of
the earlier studies that showed direct mapping by exploiting data and auxiliary
information is more effective than intermediate attribute prediction stages. Al-
though there are several studies which build on what ALE does 2, we believe
results of ALE will be representative of the adversarial robustness of this family
of ZSL approaches. Individual analyses of more approaches are certainly wel-
come, but is not in our scope. It must be noted that we purely focus on an
inductive setting for ZSL.
2 As noted in [57], models focusing on linear compability functions have the same
formulation, but different optimization objectives.
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3.2 Attacks and Defenses
Threat Model. Our evaluation makes several assumptions on the threat model.
We choose three white-box, per-image attacks (i.e. non-universal) where the at-
tacker has access to model architecture and its parameters. The attack model
operates under a setting where all images are attacked, regardless of their origi-
nal predictions (i.e. whether they were classified correctly by the model or not).
We choose a training-time defense (i.e. robustifying the model by re-training)
and two data-independent, pre-processing defenses, where input images are pro-
cessed before being fed to the network. The defense model operates under a
blind setting, where none of the defenders have access to attack details or the
attack frequency (i.e. defenses are applied to all images; regardless of the fact
that attacks introduced misclassifications or not). In the next sections, we briefly
present attacks and defenses considered in this work. We do not provide details
due to page limitations.
Attacks. The first attack we select is the widely-used Fast Gradient Sign
method (FGSM) attack [20] that is based on the linearity hypothesis. By taking
the gradient of the loss function with respect to the input, change of the output
with respect to each input component is effectively estimated. This information
is then used to craft adversarial perturbations that will guide the image towards
these directions, which means maximizing the loss with respect to input com-
ponents. We select FGSM due to its one-shot nature (i.e. no optimization), its
low computational complexity and the fact that it is inherently not optimized
for the minimum possible perturbation.
The second attack is the DeepFool [38] attack. DeepFool concentrates on
the distance of an image to the closest decision boundary. Essentially, DeepFool
calculates the distance to select number of decision boundaries, finds the closest
one and takes the step towards this boundary. For non-linear classifiers, this
step is approximated by an iterative regime that repeatedly tries to cross the
boundary, until an iteration limit is reached or the boundary is crossed. We
select DeepFool due to several reasons; i) it is an optimization based attack,
ii) it directly aims for the minimum perturbation, iii) it operates under the
linearity hypothesis assumption and iv) it is inherently indicative of the decision
boundary characteristics. The version of DeepFool we experiment with is the
original untargeted version that controls the perturbation with the `2 norm.
The last attack is the Carlini-Wagner [11] attack. In their paper, authors
essentially refine the objective function proposed in [8] via several improvements
and propose three different attacks where each attack uses a different `-norm
constraint to control the perturbation. We select Carlini-Wagner attacks due to
several reasons; i) it is one of the first attacks that is shown to beat an adversarial
defense, ii) one of the first to scale to ImageNet and iii) it is still one of the high-
performing attacks in the literature. We use the untargeted, `2-norm version to
have a better comparison with DeepFool.
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Defenses. The first defense analyzed is the well-known label smoothing. It is
a well-known regularization technique that prevents over-confident predictions.
Label smoothing has been shown to be a good defense mechanism [19,22] and its
success is tied to the prevention of confident classifier predictions when faced with
an out-of-distribution sample. We select label smoothing as it is i) a training-time
defense, ii) conceptually easy and iii) it is a good use case of ZSL models.
The second defense is local spatial smoothing. It has been reported that fea-
ture squeezing techniques [62] can provide robustness against adversarial exam-
ples as they effectively shrink the feature space where adversarial examples can
reside. Similar to the original paper, we use median-filter with reflect-padding to
pre-process images before they are fed to the model. We select spatial smoothing
due to i) its data and attack-independent and ii) its inexpensive nature. More-
over, testing this against non-l0 attacks is a good use case for its efficiency
3. We
do not use the detection mechanism in the original paper, but just the spatial
smoothing operation.
The last defense is the total variance minimization defense. It has been pro-
posed [21] as an input transformation defense, where the aim is to remove per-
turbations by image reconstruction. Initially, several pixels are selected with a
Bernoulli random variable from the perturbed image. Using the selected pixels,
the image is reconstructed by taking into account the total variation measure.
Total-variance minimization is shown to be an efficient defense as it encourages
the removal of small and localized perturbations. We select this defense due to
its simple and data/attack independent nature. It is also a good candidate to
evaluate different attacks due to its localized perturbation removal ability.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Dataset and Evaluation Metrics
We perform our evaluation on three widely used ZSL/GZSL datasets; Caltech-
UCSD-Birds 200-2011 (CUB) [53], Animals with Attributes 2 (AWA2) [57] and
SUN [44]. CUB is a medium-sized fine-grained dataset with 312 attributes, where
a total number of 200 classes are presented with a total of 11788 images. CUB
is a challenging case as intra-class variance is quite hard to model due to similar
appearances and low number of samples. SUN is another medium-sized fine-
grained dataset with 102 attributes. SUN, similar to CUB, is a challenging case
as it consists of 14340 images of 717 classes, resulting into even fewer images per
class compared to CUB. AWA2 is a larger-scale dataset with 85 attributes, where
a total of 50 classes are presented with 37322 images. AWA2, although it has a
higher amount of images with fewer classes, inherently makes generalization to
unseen classes harder. Throughout the experiments, we use the splits proposed
in [57] for both ZSL and GZSL experiments. We use the standard per-class top-1
accuracy for ZSL evaluation. For GZSL, per-class top-1 accuracy values for seen
and unseen classes are used to compute harmonic-scores.
3 It has been noted in [62] that this defense is inherently more effective against l0-norm
attacks.
Adversarial Robustness in Zero-Shot Learning 7
Zero Shot Generalized Zero Shot
C S A C S A
Attack Top-1 u s h u s h u s h
Original 54.5 57.4 62.0 25.6 64.6 36.7 20.5 32.3 25.1 15.3 78.8 25.7
FGSM1 40.3 47.7 42.5 18.5 45.4 26.3 17.7 25.9 21.0 10.7 58.9 18.1
FGSM2 18.5 16.3 14.8 10.8 11.7 11.2 8.1 9.8 8.9 3.4 10.0 5.1
FGSM3 15.2 11.8 16.4 9.0 10.2 9.6 4.3 5.5 4.9 2.2 11.2 3.7
DEFO1 30.9 25.6 50.6 9.1 19.1 12.3 6.4 7.2 6.8 13.3 41.2 20.1
DEFO2 30.8 25.5 50.5 9.1 18.9 12.3 6.4 7.2 6.8 13.4 41.2 20.2
DEFO3 22.4 17.8 41.4 7.6 11.5 9.2 6.3 6.3 6.3 13.0 30.2 18.2
CaWa1 28.9 43.1 43.2 17.0 29.0 21.4 17.7 24.9 20.7 15.2 56.3 24.0
CaWa2 25.9 40.9 36.9 16.4 24.4 19.6 17.7 23.9 20.3 15.2 46.6 22.9
CaWa3 24.6 39.8 34.7 15.9 23.1 18.9 17.5 23.4 20.0 15.2 43.6 22.5
Table 1. Results when all images are attacked. C, S and A stand for CUB, SUN and
AWA2 datasets, respectively. Parameters: [FGSM1−3 : 0.001, 0.01, 0.1] [DeepFool1−3
max iter, : (3,1e-6), (3,1e-5), (10,1e-6)] [C&W1−3 max iter: 3,6,10 ]. Top-1 is the top-1
accuracy, where u, s and h are unseen, seen and harmonic accuracy values, respectively.
4.2 Implementation Details
In order to make the computational graph end-to-end differentiable, we merge
the ResNet-101 [23] (used to produce AWA2 [57] dataset embeddings) feature
extractor with ALE model. To reproduce the results of ALE reported in [57], we
freeze the feature extractor and only train ALE for each dataset. In our tables,
the reproduced values of ALE are denoted as original, although there are slight
variations compared to the original results reported by the authors in [57]. We
use PyTorch [43] for our experiments.
For FGSM, we sweep with a large range of  values where we end up with
visible perturbations. We primarily sweep with maximum iteration and  (added
value to cross the boundary) parameter for DeepFool (DEFO) and Carlini-
Wagner (CaWa, C&W) attacks, as we observe diminishing returns (i.e. not
producing strong attacks despite reaching intractable compute time) for other
parameters. We assign 0.9 to the ground-truth class in label smoothing defense.
For spatial smoothing and total-variance minimization, we use 3x3 windows and
maximum iteration of 3, respectively. We apply the same attack and defense
parameters for every dataset to facilitate a better comparison of dataset charac-
teristics.
4.3 Results
Attacks. First, we present the effect of each attack setting on ZSL/GZSL per-
formance metrics. Results are shown in Table 1.
In ZSL setting, we see every attack has managed to introduce a visible detri-
mental effect on accuracy values across all datasets. As expected, stronger at-
tacks introduce more pronounced attacks, FGSM being the most effective across
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Zero Shot Generalized Zero Shot
C S A C S A
Attack Top-1 u s h u s h u s h
Original 54.5 57.4 62.0 25.6 64.6 36.7 20.5 32.3 25.1 15.3 78.8 25.7
SpS 49.3 53.2 59.3 21.5 56.5 31.1 20.1 28.0 23.4 14.3 75.5 24.1
LbS 52.2 55.2 60.6 22.7 56.2 32.4 18.4 31.6 23.3 16.3 74.2 26.8
TVM 51.4 54.0 60.3 24.4 60.7 34.8 19.9 29.5 23.8 12.9 76.4 22.1
Table 2. Results where all images are defended (without any attacks). SpS, LbS and
TVM are spatial smoothing, label smoothing and total-variance minimization, respec-
tively.
all datasets. This is an expected behaviour as we effectively introduce visible
and quite strong attacks in the last FGSM setting. In CUB, we see C&W at-
tack leading in low maximum iterations, but it starts losing out to DeepFool in
higher maximum iterations. In SUN, although introducing some effects, C&W
fails to impress and scale with the increasing maximum iteration values, where
DeepFool manages to do a better job. In AWA2, C&W actually does a better job
than DeepFool across all parameter settings. FGSM introduces an upward accu-
racy spike in AWA2, despite its increasing strength. This is primarily caused by
actually changing originally incorrectly predicted labels to their correct labels,
thereby increasing the accuracy. Lastly, DeepFool produces diminishing returns
except the highest maximum iteration setting, across all datasets.
In GZSL setting, we again see an across the board reduction of accuracy
values in all datasets. In CUB, DeepFool is the best performing attack, despite
FGSM producing significantly more visible perturbations. In SUN, DeepFool
loses out to FGSM slightly, though the produced perturbation is still signifi-
cantly less visible. For CUB and SUN, DeepFool actually takes about the same
time to produce the attack regardless of the maximum iteration value, indicating
that it manages to cross the boundary in really few iterations, basically making
10 maximum iterations unnecessary. This means the class boundaries are close
to each other and easy to cross, which makes sense as SUN and CUB has signif-
icantly more classes compared to AWA2. However, we do not see that effect for
C&W, meaning it still needs more iterations to successfully cross the boundary
despite needing the highest compute time. In AWA2, FGSM has a significant
lead; DeepFool is somewhat effective but fails to impress. C&W, on the other
hand, basically fails to introduce any meaningful degradation in accuracy, espe-
cially in unseen accuracy values. As can be seen from the Table 1, this is actually
a wider phenomenon; unseen accuracies are less effected compared to their seen
counterparts. We investigate this issue in depth in the following sections.
Defenses. Before going through the recovery rates of each defense, we first
apply the defenses without any attacks to see what the effects of defenses are;
a defense that is actually degrading the results are naturally not suitable for
use. Results are shown in Table 2. We see modest detrimental effects of defenses
across the board, which we believe to be acceptable given the improvements they
bring. We also see that in AWA2, label smoothing actually improves the GZSL
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Zero Shot Generalized Zero Shot
C S A C S A
Attack Top-1 u s h u s h u s h
Original 54.5 57.4 62.0 25.6 64.6 36.7 20.5 32.3 25.1 15.3 78.8 25.7
FGSM1 47.9 51.1 54.5 20.3 53.5 29.4 19.8 26.0 22.5 12.7 70.0 21.5
FGSM2 31.9 36.0 24.6 14.5 30.5 19.7 14.5 16.6 15.5 6.2 25.3 10.0
DEFO1 46.4 49.0 58.0 18.8 50.1 27.3 15.9 21.0 18.1 13.5 69.3 22.6
DEFO3 46.2 48.8 58.0 18.7 50.0 27.2 15.9 21.0 18.1 13.1 68.8 22.1
CaWa1 48.3 52.7 58.2 21.0 55.0 30.5 20.2 27.3 23.2 14.2 73.6 23.9
CaWa3 48.4 52.3 58.2 21.0 54.9 30.4 20.0 27.2 23.1 14.2 73.3 23.8
Table 3. Results when all images are attacked and then defended with spatial smooth-
ing. Parameter sets of the attacks are same as Table 1.
performance compared to its original value. There is no winner in this regard,
although label smoothing and total-variance minimization tend to do a better job
than spatial smoothing. We now analyze the effects of each defense under several
attack settings; we note that we omit one setting per each attack algorithm from
our defense analysis; they either introduce extreme perturbations (FGSM3) or
negligible effects compared to their weaker counterpart (DeepFool2 and C&W2)
Spatial smoothing results are shown in Table 3 4. In ZSL setting, we see quite
good recoveries across all datasets. The recovered accuracy values are naturally
better for weaker attacks. We see quite similar recovered accuracy values for each
DeepFool and C&W settings (DeepFool1 vs DeepFool3, C&W1 vs C&W3), in
constrast with what we see for FGSM. This is potentially due to the nature of
the attacks; FGSM strength scales proportionally with the coefficient , whereas
maximum iteration for C&W and DeepFool acts like a binary switch indicating
whether the attacks will function or not. In GZSL setting, results generally show
the same trends with ZSL. However, we see negligible recoveries for C&W and
DeepFool in AWA2, especially in unseen accuracy values. Surprisingly, spatial
smoothing degrades the unseen and harmonic scores of C&W1 even compared to
its original (unattacked) values. This phenomenon will be investigated in-depth
in the following sections.
Label smoothing results are shown in Table 4. Although we can not directly
compare recovered accuracies to ones reported in Table 1 as the original accuracy
is different, we compare the trends to gain insights for label smoothing. In ZSL
setting, we see no visible gains for FGSM and even reductions in accuracy for
some cases. DeepFool results are actually improved for some cases and C&W
sees the most dramatic improvements among all attacks. In GZSL, similar trends
with ZSL is observed; FGSM seems unaffected, DeepFool is slightly recovered
but C&W is the most recovered attack.
Total-variance minimization results are shown in Table 5. In ZSL setting,
we observe across the board recoveries for every attack setting. Similar to what
we observed in spatial smoothing, recovered values for DeepFool and C&W are
4 Tables 3, 4 and 5 should be compared to Table 1.
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Zero Shot Generalized Zero Shot
C S A C S A
Attack Top-1 u s h u s h u s h
Original 52.2 55.2 60.6 22.7 56.2 32.4 18.4 31.6 23.3 16.3 74.2 26.8
FGSM1 39.8 46.8 41.1 17.4 43.7 24.9 15.7 25.2 19.4 12.1 59.8 20.1
FGSM2 11.7 15.2 14.1 6.7 9.8 0.80 5.5 7.7 6.4 2.7 10.3 4.4
DEFO1 29.8 30.4 49.6 10.0 20.3 13.4 6.2 8.8 7.3 14.01 42.4 21.1
DEFO3 19.8 19.2 41.7 8.2 11.9 9.7 5.2 7.1 6.0 13.1 25.5 17.3
CaWa1 38.8 45.6 46.6 19.4 40.4 26.3 16.2 26.6 20.1 16.4 61.0 25.9
CaWa3 34.1 42.7 40.6 18.8 34.8 24.5 16.2 25.1 19.7 16.2 52.0 24.7
Table 4. Results when all images are attacked and then defended with label smoothing.
Parameter sets of the attacks are same as Table 1. Original results are results obtained
by training ALE with label-smoothing.
similar in values. Compared to other defenses, TVM does the best job in ZSL
accuracy recovery. In GZSL setting, we see similar trends with ZSL. However,
we observe in AWA2 that unseen accuracies actually go down when TVM is
applied, especially for DeepFool and C&W. For C&W, this effect is also present
for harmonic scores. This is similar to what we observed in spatial smoothing,
however the effect is more pronounced. This will be investigated later in the
paper.
Summary. In attacks, an unbounded, high epsilon FGSM attack is the
strongest and the fastest one, as expected. However, when minimum perturba-
tion is considered, FGSM loses out to DeepFool and C&W significantly. Across
all datasets, DeepFool seems to be the best trade-off between perturbation mag-
nitude and attack success. In defenses, we see varying degrees of success for
each dataset. In CUB, we see spatial smoothing to the best for FGSM attacks,
whereas TVM is the best for the rest. In AWA2, spatial smoothing is the best
all-around defense for every attack setting. For SUN, spatial smoothing is still
the best for FGSM, however TVM has a lead in C&W and DeepFool. Label
smoothing is the worst defense all around and TVM is the most compute-heavy
one, as expected. We present qualitative samples in Figure 1.
4.4 Analysis
It is clear that adversarial examples can be considered as out-of-distribution
samples which we fail to recognize properly. As they do not have their own
class prototypes, the learned ranking system incorrectly assigns them to a class.
Effectively, we require a mechanism to transfer knowledge from clean to adver-
sarial images, on top of the seen-to-unseen transfer we need to tackle already.
Moreover, possibly from a simpler perspective, ZSL models can be considered as
immature compared to supervised models; accuracy levels are not on the same
level. The second perspective harbors interesting facts. Assuming a model with
the perfect accuracy, we know attacks can only degrade the results, assuming
they are effective. Defenses can still degrade the results without any attacks, but
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Zero Shot Generalized Zero Shot
C S A C S A
Attack Top-1 u s h u s h u s h
Original 54.5 57.4 62.0 25.6 64.6 36.7 20.5 32.3 25.1 15.3 78.8 25.7
FGSM1 49.1 53.2 53.8 23.0 57.5 32.8 18.9 28.3 22.7 11.7 71.8 20.1
FGSM2 25.3 32.8 21.1 12.6 21.9 16.0 12.6 15.3 13.8 5.0 22.5 8.2
DEFO1 48.4 50.3 59.0 19.7 52.3 28.6 15.2 20.8 17.5 12.5 70.9 21.4
DEFO3 48.3 50.3 59.0 19.5 52.3 28.4 15.1 20.8 17.5 12.5 70.6 21.3
CaWa1 50.9 53.3 58.8 24.0 60.3 34.3 20.0 29.2 23.8 12.7 75.6 21.7
CaWa3 51.2 53.4 58.9 24.2 60.2 34.4 19.9 29.1 23.6 12.6 75.6 21.6
Table 5. Results when all images are attacked and then defended with total-variance
minimization. Parameter sets of the attacks are same as in Table 1.
we know they alleviate the issues to a certain degree, assuming they are effective.
What happens when the model is far from perfect is what we focus on now.
Class-transitions: False/Correct. It is observed throughout the attacks
that in GZSL setting, unseen accuracies are less effected compared to seen accu-
racies. We further investigate this by looking at the class-transitions during each
attack setting. For each class, we calculate the ratio of class transitions; out of
all (originally) correctly predicted samples, what percentage have transitioned
to false? Out of all (originally) falsely predicted samples, what percentage have
transitioned to correct or other false classes? Our results are shown in Table 6.
Stronger the attack, higher correct-to-false (CF) percentages we observe.
Moreover, stronger attacks also introduce higher false-to-other-false (FF) ratios.
This simply means regardless of the success of original predictions, stronger at-
tacks induce more class transitions. Statistically, there is also the possibility of
an attack correcting an originally incorrect prediction. We observe the highest
FC ratios in C&W attacks and the lowest in DeepFool attacks. Coupled with the
lowest CF ratios, this can be the reason as to why C&W performed the worst
in our attack scenarios.
When we compare seen and unseen classes, we see higher FC ratios for seen
classes. Moreover, seen classes have smaller CF ratios which means seen classes
are less effected detrimentally and more effected positively. This contradicts with
our starting point; unseen classes being less effected by an attack than seen
classes. However, unseen classes have a lot of initially zero accuracy classes and
they are not taken into account in our calculation. This leads to fewer number
of classes with higher than 0 accuracy and fewer correctly predicted samples for
each (as unseen accuracies are low all around). Once these samples are effected,
we observe higher FC rates. However, high FC rates in seen classes tells us that
in an event of misclassification, the algorithm predicts the correct class with a
high probability, but not high enough to be the highest prediction. This is an
interesting effect of the adversarial attacks, which means softmax probabilities
are quite close to each other, and class boundary transition is easier. Conversely,
one can expect high CF ratios for seen classes, but this is not the case. However,
it can be related to the fact that the model, for seen classes, is robust against
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Generalized Zero Shot
C S A
Class Type U S U S U S
Transitions CF FC FF CF FC FF CF FC FF CF FC FF CF FC FF CF FC FF
FGSM1 81 20 69 55 40 47 65 11 65 54 16 59 89 12 69 39 49 43
FGSM2 99 18 82 99 36 64 99 12 87 98 16 84 100 5 93 94 33 67
DEFO1 91 10 82 83 21 70 93 8 89 95 10 87 53 7 61 55 26 44
DEFO3 94 11 84 93 22 72 94 8 90 98 10 88 60 7 72 74 28 49
CaWa1 92 24 69 78 39 51 63 12 61 55 15 57 81 16 58 43 53 36
CaWa3 95 24 70 86 40 53 67 13 66 61 10 90 89 18 64 60 57 38
Table 6. Categorization of prediction changes induced by each attack. U and S columns
are results for unseen and seen classes, respectively. CF, FC and FF are correct-to-false
(as the percentage of all originally correct predictions), false-to-correct and false-to-
other-false (as the percentage of all originally incorrect predictions) changes in %,
represented as per-class normalized ratio averages. Classes having no originally correct
or incorrect predictions have not been included in the calculation.
attacks when it comes to correct predictions, but its false predictions are not
really confident.
Class-transitions: Seen/Unseen. We also analyze the effect of attacks
from a seen/unseen class perspective. For each class, we calculate the following
for each class and average it for seen and unseen classes; out of all changed sam-
ples, what percent went to a seen or an unseen class? Our results are shown
in Table 7. Results show that except FGSM, attack behaviour in terms of
seen/unseen class transition seems to be stable. For FGSM, however, we see
increase in unseen-to-seen transitions, which is in line with the further decrease
of accuracy values (i.e. unseen-to-unseen can have false to correct transitions
for unseen). This behaviour bodes well with the attack settings; FGSM scales
its attack with the  coefficient whereas DeepFool and C&W simply have more
time to solve for the minimum perturbation with higher maximum iterations.
Regardless of the dataset and the attack setting, an overwhelming majority of
the transitions happen towards seen classes. This is likely due to the fact that the
model trains exclusively on seen classes and naturally is more confident about its
predictions, and this can cause a bias towards seen classes in the class boundary
transitions.
Adverse effects of defenses. As observed in Section 4.3, there have been
cases where defenses actually reduced the accuracy after the attacks rather than
recovering it. Following the work we’ve presented in Table 6, we observe the
effect of defenses (i.e. we add another layer to CF, FC, FF transitions, such
as CFC, FCF, FFC, etc) 5. Logically, we can analyse the effect of defenses in
four main categories; it corrects a mistake (CFC, FFC), it preserves the results
(CCC, FFF) and it has detrimental effects (CCF, FCF) and it fails to recover
(CFF, FCC). It must be noted that recovery here means recovering the original
label, not necessarily the correct one. Across all experiments we observe every
category of effect up to some degree, with correct-recoveries (CFC) spearheading
5 We do not include a table for this analysis due to space restrictions.
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Generalized Zero Shot
C S A
Class Transition UU US SU SS UU US SU SS UU US SU SS
FGSM1 30 70 16 84 22 78 10 90 17 83 7 93
FGSM2 28 72 18 82 17 83 10 90 12 88 7 93
DEFO1 24 76 20 80 16 84 10 90 13 87 7 93
DEFO3 24 76 20 80 16 84 10 90 14 86 7 93
CaWa1 31 69 17 83 22 78 10 90 24 76 8 92
CaWa3 31 69 17 83 22 78 10 90 25 75 9 91
Table 7. Attack-induced, per-class normalized class transition averages (in %) for
different attack settings. UU, US, SU and SS are unseen-to-unseen, unseen-to-seen,
seen-to-unseen and seen-to-seen transitions, respectively.
the overall recovery of accuracy values. However, we observe that the defense-
induced reduction of accuracies strongly correlate with high FCF ratios. This
means alleviating the positive effects of attacks. Although the defense does its
job by recovering the original predictions, the reductions occur nonetheless.
Attacking only correct predictions. We investigate attacking only the
originally correct predictions and only defending them. This is not under the
threat model we assumed in the beginning, but it is valuable to decouple weak
model effects (i.e. low accuracy) with potential ZSL-specific effects in our results.
We do not include numerical results due to space restrictions.
We naturally observe that the unintuitive effects such as attacks improving
the results or defences degrading the results eliminated. Across all attacks, we see
more dramatic accuracy reductions and we see improvements across all defenses.
The overall rankings for best attack and defense follow our previous all images
attack settings. In this setting, results are more reminiscent of a supervised
model, however due to the extreme bias between seen and unseen classes, GZSL-
specific effects still remain (i.e. unseen and seen classes being effected differently,
class transition trends).
Dataset characteristics. The datasets considered are inherently different;
SUN and CUB have fewer samples per class and consist of high number of
classes, whereas AWA2 has high number of samples per class but consist of
fewer classes. In AWA2, we see attacks failing to effect in their weakest setting;
especially DeepFool and C&W performing their worst among other datasets.
This is likely related to the sample count of AWA2; a larger distribution per class
helps robustness, as suggested in [48]. We see FC transitions happening more
frequently compared to other datasets; this is likely an effect of multiple confident
predictions as this effect is more pronounced in seen classes. Upward accuracy
spikes that occur in FGSM attacks (this analysis is performed with a wide range
of parameters for FGSM and not included in detail due to page limitations) are
more frequent here as well (especially in ZSL setting); this is likely an effect of
having fewer number of classes as misclassifications are statistically more likely to
fall into the originally correct classes. We see similar trends for SUN and CUB
in general; SUN has the fewest transitions to unseen classes. This correlates
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C I C I C I
I C I C I C
C I C C I C
C I C C IC
Correct              Incorrect (Attacked) 
Incorrect            Correct (Attacked)
Correct              Incorrect (Attacked)   
Correct (Defended)
Correct              Correct (Attacked)   
Incorrect (Defended)
Fig. 1. Example images from AWA2 dataset. The first and second rows show (in pairs)
original and perturbed images, where attacks have induced misclassification and con-
verted mispredictions into correct predictions, respectively. Third and fourth rows show
(in triples) original, attacked and defended images where defenses have corrected and
induced misclassifications, respectively. We use a powerful attack to show a more visible
perturbation. I and C indicate incorrect and correct predictions.
strongly with the really high number of classes in SUN. In overall, we see SUN
and CUB get better returns from all defenses, compared to AWA2.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Despite their stunning success, it is shown that machine learning models can be
fooled with carefully crafted perturbations. Adversarial robustness have gener-
ally been studied from a fully supervised perspective. ZSL and GZSL algorithms
that lack supervision for a set of classes have not received attention for their
adversarial robustness. In this paper, we introduce a study aiming to fill this
gap by assessing a well-known ZSL model for its adversarial robustness, both
ZSL and GZSL evaluation set-ups. We subject the model to several attacks and
defenses across widely-used ZSL datasets. Our results indicate that adversarial
robustness for ZSL has its own challenges, such as the extreme data bias and
the comparably immature state of the field (compared to supervised learning).
We highlight and analyse several points, especially in GZSL settings, to guide
future researchers as to what needs attention in making ZSL models robust and
also what points could be important for interpreting the results.
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